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ABSTRACT
One of the biggest challenges in making vehicular networks
a reality is security. Aside from the clear need for vehicles
to be able to authenticate messages from certain personnel,
such as police officers and ambulances, secure end-to-end
communication will also benefit numerous distributed appli-
cations that will be running over these vehicular networks.
In this paper, we argue that four design goals must be met
for any feasible VANET security system: it must (1) be
scalable and allow for correct and efficient authentication,
encryption, and key distribution and revocation, (2) be de-
lay tolerant, (3) be DoS resistant, and (4) utilize existing
infrastructure in a fashion such that it is readily deployable
today, with minimal infrastructure changes. We present and
analyze VIBES, a system using Identity-based Encryption
and Signatures that meets these design goals and addresses
much of the practical issues surrounding the implementa-
tion of a vehicular network security system. Furthermore,
we show a performance evaluation comparing it to popular
certificate-based schemes.
1. INTRODUCTION
Vehicle technology in the near future will look vastly dif-
ferent than it does today. As vehicles become equipped with
short-range radios, large scale vehicular networks will enable
numerous vehicle-based distributed applications. Charac-
teristics of this network will include both areas of high con-
nectivity and density, resembling a highly connected ad hoc
network, as well as areas of intermittent connectivity and
partitioning, resembling a delay tolerant network. The en-
vironment will therefore be highly dynamic and very large.
This technology will enable new communication options
for companies and individual users. One important set of
applications include end-to-end vehicle-to-vehicle communi-
cation. As an example, consider a trucking company wish-
ing to utilize this network to collect and disseminate data to
their trucks for automated route planning or other “smart
car” functionality. Individual trucks could automatically
and periodically, with no user intervention, contact other
trucks along possible paths and obtain real-time road con-
ditions, traffic reports, and weather conditions which aid in
the route planning process. This periodic data will allow the
on-board computer to make educated guesses when planning
the optimal route. For application such as these, end-to-end
vehicular communication is ideal. In many cases, VANETs
are a cost-efficient alternative to cellular technology.
Due to the shared, open nature of the network, practical
end-to-end security must be available to prevent malicious
entities from interrupting or stealing confidential business or
individual information. Faking trucker identities or editing
in-transit data can, depending on what materials or infor-
mation the truck may be carrying, have devastating results.
Therefore, practical end-to-end security is necessary to sup-
port upcoming distributed applications.
Since vehicular networks are still in the design phase, it
is important to integrate them with effective security solu-
tions. We identity four main requirements for supporting
security for distributed applications running over VANETs,
which provide the minimum functionality for deploying these
networks today. First, the system must provide efficient,
manageable, and correct authentication and encryption, as
well as key distribution and revocation. Second, it must
be delay and disruption tolerant, since many sparse por-
tions of the VANET will likely have intermittent connectiv-
ity. Third, the system must be resistant to denial of service
attacks. Fourth, the system must utilize existing infrastruc-
ture, where infrastructure is both information (e.g., license
plate numbers) and physical objects (e.g., existing car ra-
dios), in a fashion that is readily deployable today, or in the
very near future, with little infrastructure-based upgrades.
Although not specific to security solutions, utilizing cur-
rent infrastructure is important for the rapid, near-term de-
ployment of distributed applications. For about a decade,
highways and mass transit have been part of the United
States’ critical infrastructure [9]. The result of this, as well
as much attention in the private industry, indicates that se-
curity must be an integral part of vehicular networks from
the start, and hence must rely on the current infrastructure
to support these applications. However, there is little prac-
tical end-to-end security work for vehicular networks that
could be deployed in the near-term.
In this paper, we present VIBES (Vanet with Identity-
Based Encryption/Signatures), an end-to-end security sys-
tem that provides manageable authentication and encryp-
tion to both centrally distributed and peer-to-peer applica-
tions. The novelty of VIBES comes from the integration
of Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) and Identity-Based Sig-
natures (IBS), as opposed to other popular techniques like
Public Key Infrastructure, into the existing transportation
and communication infrastructure. VIBES, utilizing IBE,
fits very well into vehicular networks, since it offers a high
level of security while providing some delay tolerance and
denial of service protection. Since public keys in VIBES
are inherently bound to user identification, no certificate is
required to authenticate a foreign party. VIBES also intro-
duces a novel key revocation and restoration scheme that uti-
lizes both time-based keys as well as wide-area radio broad-
casts. Additionally, by utilizing the existing infrastructure,
VIBES will be deployable in the very near future.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 goes into depth about VANET security design de-
cisions and goals. Section 3 describes our approach to se-
curity using IBE, including how authentication, encryption,
and key distribution and revocation are performed. Section
4 provides a realistic performance evaluation comparing our
approach to a popular CA-based scheme. Related work is
presented in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2. SECURING VEHICULAR NETWORKS
The basis for any secure vehicular network starts with
effective mechanisms for providing adequate levels of secu-
rity in a scalable fashion [6]. This necessarily includes the
ability to efficiently distribute and revocate keys. Further-
more, since the density of vehicles in any area is far from
evenly distributed, many partitions will exist at any given
time. Therefore, security solutions in these environments
must operate despite unpredictable delays and disruptions.
Finally, security systems must be readily deployable with
existing infrastructure.
2.1 Trustworthy, Scalable Systems
The security infrastructure in vehicular networks must
provide an adequate level of security as well as be scalable.
Symmetric-key based cryptosystems using pairwise shared
keys between all nodes quickly become infeasible due to scal-
ability as well as key distribution issues. While public key
cryptosystems do not suffer from such scalability problems,
not all public key solutions are applicable to vehicular net-
works. In the rest of this subsection, we discuss the main
public key approaches and in the next two subsections dis-
cuss how well suited they are for vehicular networks.
PKI (public key infrastructure) approaches are the most
popular popular public key cryptosystem and are widely
used on the Internet. Certificate authorities (CAs) are re-
sponsible for issuing certificates to individuals that allow
parties who trust the CA to authenticate one another. Cen-
tralized PKI is in wide-spread use, is scalable (popular ex-
amples include VeriSign [2] and Thawte [1]), and provides
high levels of security. Distributed PKI (e.g., COCA [15])
can also be used to lessen the load of a centralized server,
while remaining quite scalable and providing strong levels
of security. Here, a node is required to contact at least k of
these n CAs (referred to as the cryptographic threshold) to
perform general certificate operations.
Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) provides a means of elim-
inating certificates altogether, and was proposed in 1984 [12].
IBE uses alphanumeric strings that are well-known or easy
to obtain through out-of-band channels (e.g., email addresses
or, in our case, license plate numbers) as public keys. These
keys are assumed to be inherently bound to parties’ identi-
ties such that the certificate “look-up step” is not required.
When a user joins the network, it contacts a private key
generator (PKG) and obtains a private key for the chosen
public key. To communicate with any party, one simply has
to recall the party’s identity to verify their signature This
technique provides high levels of security and is centralized
via the PKG, and so, sufficiently scalable.
In decentralized web-of-trust based systems, like PGP [16],
trust chains are not signed by any trustworthy centralized
servers, but rather signed by individual clients that vouch
for another party in a transitive fashion. Since this type of
approach removes the centralized, trusted component, the
level of security may be compromised. Therefore, decentral-
ized web-of-trust systems are not appropriate for vehicular
network applications that require high levels of security.
2.2 Disruption Tolerance
A security system for VANETs must have some degree
of disruption tolerance. The rational for this design deci-
sion is that any network formed over vehicles will be heavily
partitioned due to vastly different vehicle densities in any
given area. It is clearly advantageous to be able to commu-
nicate within one connected component without having to
first communicate with parties outside of the partition.
Centralized PKI solutions clearly fail in partitioned net-
works. When two unauthenticated nodes wish to communi-
cate, look-up steps must be performed for both nodes to ob-
tain the other’s public key in a trustworthy fashion. Unless
the nodes are in the same partition as the CA, they will not
be able to perform these lookup steps. This issue is realized
in literature as a solid reason to not use centralized PKI as a
security solution for intermittently connected networks [11].
While distributed PKI alleviates the problem slightly, since
there are more CAs that can be contacted, there would have
to be k of the n total CAs in each foreseeable partition to
eliminate the problem. This is not feasible for many rea-
sons, one being that partitions are dynamically created. In
comparison, IBE works well in intermittently connected en-
vironments since the lookup steps are eliminated.
2.3 DoS Resistance
A third characteristic of any practical vehicular network
security system is denial-of-service resistance. If an attacker
is able to deny service in security-related lookup steps, such
as preventing certificates or certificate revocation lists from
propagating, then they can cripple the entire system.
A DoS attack on a relatively small portion of the net-
work should not cause the entire network to suffer substan-
tially. In the centralized PKI approaches, attacks launched
at nodes near the CA may prevent communication to and
from the CA, severely limiting network functionality. While
centralized PKI is not DoS resistant, distributed PKI may
be since an attacker must affect a larger number of nodes
(n−k+1) to cripple the network. IBE is DoS resistant during
normal operations since the lookup step is removed. There
are cases, however, where IBE must be secured against DoS
attacks. Two of these operations are obtaining a private
key from the centralized (or possibly hierarchical) PKG, as
well as obtaining public key revocation lists. In Section 3,
we discuss how to make these operations DoS resistant in
vehicular networks.
2.4 Utilization of Existing Infrastructure
For deployment purposes, a security approach should uti-
lize as much of the existing infrastructure as possible, so as
to not demand major infrastructure changes and to allow
the system to be practical and monetarily attractive. Mini-
mal or no changes to the infrastructure allow the system to
be implemented in the near-term without major investments
by corporate or government parties.
Centralized PKI solutions require centralized infrastruc-
ture capable of communicating with the vehicular network
and quickly processing requests on-the-fly. While this is not
a large infrastructure change, it does constitute a certain
amount of investment. However, the major disqualification
of centralized PKI fall within the first two design goals. Dis-
tributed PKI, on the other hand, requires a much larger
infrastructure investment, since multiple CAs must be in-
stalled and maintained. Furthermore, out-of-band channels
must be setup or purchased for the CAs to communicate,
assuming their control and management channels are not,
for security reasons, traveling over the ad hoc vehicular net-
work. In this case, the monetary investment as well as the
infrastructure change may be significant.
In IBE-based solutions, we show it is possible to keep in-
frastructure change to a minimum by utilizing existing in-
frastructure as much as possible. While a PKG must be
setup, it does not have to process requests in real-time and
can be contacted out-of-band. The two popular means of
revocation, particularly expiration of time-based keys and
revocation lists, can also utilize existing infrastructure. For
instance, wide broadcasts of revocation lists can be done
via existing radio towers and/or satellites with vehicles uses
standard antenna for reception, as shown in Section 3.
In summary, IBE offers the best characteristics to quickly
and practically enable, deploy, and use a vehicular network
security system. Therefore, the design of VIBES is based on
IBE as a fundamental building block.
3. A SECURITY SYSTEM USING IBE
VIBES is designed primarily for standard communica-
tion between applications and users in a vehicular network.
VIBES is scalable, and secure, while being both denial of
service resistant and usable in intermittently connected net-
works. Furthermore, it offers quick key revocation and key
restoration. Therefore, public keys, which are inherently
bound to IDs, and in our case license plate numbers, can
be safely restored and reused after compromise due to the
use of the time-based key structure. In this section, we first
present a threat model that describes the power of an at-
tacker, and then present a detailed description of VIBES.
3.1 Threat Model
To highlight the effectiveness and limitations of VIBES,
in this section we present a realistic threat model.
We assume that a malicious attacker has the ability to:
(1) read and store all data transmitted across the wire-
less medium, without repercussion, (2) physically compro-
mise one or more nodes (i.e., vehicles) in the network, with
the stipulation that proper authorities (i.e., police) will be
quickly (but not instantly) notified of the compromise, and
(3) obtain any sensitive cryptographic information, includ-
ing stored keys, from physically compromised nodes.
However, the attacker cannot compromise entities that are
not part of the standard vehicular network. In the case of
IBE, this involves private key generators (PKGs) and stan-
dard radio towers. It also cannot jam a large portion of a
dedicated, police-monitored radio frequency.
3.2 VIBES Public Keys
In VIBES, standard vehicle-to-vehicle authentication and/or
encryption is done via IBE. IBE allows any alphanumeric
string to act as a public key, while the corresponding pri-
vate key is mathematically generated and distributed by a
private key generator (PKG). In VIBES, a public key for a
vehicle is the vehicle’s license plate number. When a vehicle
wishes to send an authenticated message to another vehicle,
the sending vehicle digitally signs it with the private key
obtained from the PKG. The receiving node, knowing the
identity of the sender and hence the sender’s public key, can
verify the signature using the sender’s public key. Note that
the only “lookup step” required is to obtain a private key
from the PKG. This, however, can be done off-line or, in the
case of time-based keys, pushed from the PKG.
In VIBES, public keys are the concatenation of the State,
license plate number, and current day, month, and year. The
first two components guarantee that public keys are unique
throughout the nation (a country code could be added to
make this system world-wide), and the time component al-
lows the key to be time-based, which is used for the property
of key restoration. For example, a public key for a vehicle
registered in California may look like:
California.123ABC.25/5/2010
This public key format allows for existing infrastructure to
be utilized, meaning there is no need for extra information
such as electronic license plate numbers.
In VIBES, public keys expire every day and hence new
private keys must be pushed from the PKG to every vehicle
every day. This, however, is clearly infeasible. Therefore,
we introduce the concept of an Annual Key Card (AKC)
that contains a set of 365 private keys, one for each day of
the year. We envision these AKCs being obtained out-of-
band during annual visits to vehicular organizations such as
Motor Vehicle Services. These AKCs will be simple USB
cards that can interface with the on-board computer in a
way that a human can easily load the day’s key into the
vehicle. Note that this requires little to no infrastructure
change since USB sticks are inexpensive and can easily hold
365 private keys.
3.3 Key Revocation and Restoration
The key revocation is a fundamental issue with IBE, since
public keys are inherently bound to identities. For this rea-
son, it is common to use time-based public keys that expire.
This allows the period of compromise to be limited to the
current time slice However, we view this solution as unac-
ceptable since there is still a non-negligible period of time
where an attacker can do substantial damage via “identity
theft”. Therefore, to meet the design goal of being secure,
VIBES uses key revocation broadcasts that are able to be
sent in a reasonable amount of time after a compromise.
VIBES utilizes the existing infrastructure of radio tow-
ers (and/or satellite radio) and vehicle antennas to imme-
diately broadcast key revocations and ”key un-revocations”
over a dedicated channel. Every time police are informed of
a stolen car, that license plate number is sent over the ded-
icated ratio station. To give a perspective of the amount of
data that will need to be sent using this scheme, in 1997 the
FBI estimated that there was a car stolen in America once
every 23 seconds [3]. It therefore seems feasible that revo-
cation lists for the current day would introduce a minimal
amount of processing overhead for vehicles. Determining the
frequency of these broadcasts is left for future work. Once a
vehicle learns of a revoked license plate or public key, it does
not send data to that vehicle. This technique does require
a little infrastructure change. A second antenna is needed
per vehicle tuned to the dedicated frequency. Additionally,
radio towers need a way to receive revocation lists, which is
quite feasible via satellite radio broadcasts to radio receivers
in the towers.
VIBES utilizes the time-based keys for key restoration.
We define key restoration as the process of allowing the
reuse of the same public identifier after that identifier has
been compromised. This is an attractive property for VIBES
since one does not have to give up one’s identity (e.g., public
key, or license plate in our case), after compromise. Fur-
thermore, while it is not acceptable to wait for some non-
negligible period of time for a key to be revoked, it generally
is acceptable to wait for a period of time for a key to be re-
stored. When a compromised (e.g., stolen) vehicle is recov-
ered, the owner may immediately use the same public key
(assuming the AKC was not compromised). In the case that
the vehicle was returned on the same day, the owner would
have to wait until the end of the day, since the daily private
key may still be compromised. A ”key un-revocation”can be
immediately issued to the network via the same broadcast
mechanism as key revocations.
Note that this is a different, and somewhat reverse, ap-
proach than that which is common. Time-based keys are
generally used for key revocation, and the concept of key
restoration is often overlooked. We propose that time-based
keys be used for the less time-critical step of restoration,
and immediate broadcasts should be used for the more time-
critical step of revocation. For key restoration to properly
occur, we do not recommend preloading all of the keys into
the vehicle. This is because if a vehicle is compromised, key
restoration will not be able to occur until the end of the
year, although the key will still be revoked immediately.
The aforementioned use of a license plate-based public key
scheme, as well as VIBES’ approach to key revocation and
restoration, makes VIBES both delay tolerant and DoS re-
sistant. VIBES is delay tolerant since the PKGs must only
be contacted once a year, and not during live message ex-
changes. Furthermore, with the prominence of radio towers
and the wide coverage of satellites, it is unlikely that many
vehicles will be unable to receive messages from the dedi-
cated channel. The system is also DoS resistant since the
PKGs are contacted out-of-band, and our threat model as-
sumes attackers cannot jam a large area of the dedicated
frequency without being detected.
4. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
The primary goal of our evaluation is to gauge the perfor-
mance benefits of IBE (the basis for VIBES), compared to
a standard certificate authority (CA) scheme. Our evalua-
tion shows that IBE always performs better than standard
CA schemes in terms of message delivery ratio and message
delay, as expected. We were particularly interested in the
potential of an IBE scheme, compared to a CA scheme. The
performance benefits of IBE become very large as the net-
work becomes more disconnected.
To evaluate the performance of IBE against a standard CA
scheme, we capture both the message delivery ratio as well
as the average message delay for the authenticated messages
that were delivered. As an additional metric supporting
the hypothesis that a CA scheme results in high message
delay, especially in poorly connected environments, the CA-
based scheme is evaluated using the average message delay
for messages from a source whom the destination has not
yet seen and so does not have a certificate for. This metric
indicates how long it takes for the first message sent from a
source to a destination to be received and verified.
To highlight the benefits of IBE in an intermittently con-
nected network and to test our second design goal of being
delay tolerant, it is interesting to evaluate both metrics over
the level of connectivity in the network. To capture and con-
trol the connectivity level in the network, the transmission
range of the nodes is adjusted, decreasing it to obtain less
connected scenarios and increasing it to obtain more con-
nected scenarios. We use the Spray and Wait [13] routing
protocol to route data through the network, since it is a de-
lay tolerant networking protocol and much better suited for
intermittently connected networks than standard MANET
routing protocols (such as AODV [7] and DSR [4]).
Simulations are executed using the ONE [5] DTN simu-
lator. Each datapoint is an average of 10 runs with a 95%
confidence interval. All simulations are performed using 100
vehicles (with the addition of a stationary CA node in the
CA set) traveling over true roadway paths, in a random
fashion, in a 4.5km by 3.4km section of Helsinki, Finland.
Vehicle speeds vary between 10km/hr and 50km/hr. Every
vehicle generates 1 message per minute of size 20kB destined
for another random vehicle. Vehicles are equipped with 5MB
of buffer space. Packets are generated for the first 1800 sec-
onds of the total 3600 seconds in a simulation.
In the IBE scheme, when a destination first obtains a mes-
sage from a sender, it immediately verifies the message with-
out having to contact a CA. In the CA scheme, a sender gen-
erates a message and transmits it to the destination. Upon
reception, the destination checks to see if it has a proper cer-
tificate for the source. If so, the destination verifies the mes-
sage at that time. If not, the destination sends a certificate
request to the CA and buffers the message. If a certificate
request for that source is already outstanding, the destina-
tion does not send a further request. When the appropriate
certificate is received, the vehicle attempts to authenticate
any buffered messages from the source and stores the certifi-
cate in a certificate list. We estimate the size of certificate
requests to be 4kB, and certificate replies to be 1kB.
The IBE scheme strongly outperforms the CA scheme in
both message delivery ratio and average message delay. In
terms of message delivery ratio, IBE operating at the lowest
level of connectivity (tx range of 8 meters) outperforms the
CA scheme even at a very high level of connectivity (trans-
mission range 128 meters). This is illustrated in Figure 1a.
Furthermore, in low levels of connectivity, the CA scheme
virtually collapses with less than a 30% delivery ratio, while
the IBE scheme remains at higher than an 80% delivery ra-
tio. This illustrates the delay tolerance of IBE and the delay
intolerance of CA-based schemes.
For average message delay, a similar trend occurs. In
lower connectivity environments, IBE greatly outperforms
the CA scheme, delivering messages with lower delay. In
higher connectivity environments, we notice improvements
in both IBE and CA schemes, with IBE always perform-
ing better (see Figure 1b). Finally, when the destination
does not have a certificate for the source in the CA scheme,
the average message delay of the first message is extremely
high. Only the CA scheme is shown here, because for the
IBE scheme, the first message is no different then any other
message in terms of latency, and hence results will be simi-
lar to that of Figure 1b. These results show that IBE has a
higher performance potential then CA-based schemes.
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Figure 1: Varying Tx Range (a) MDR, (b) Average Delay, (c) First Message Average Delay
5. RELATED WORK
The specific use of IBE in securing vehicular networks
has been briefly proposed in the literature, although most
of this work only suggests the idea and provides little or
no details of how to design and deploy such a system. One
particular system, VDTLS [8], was developed specifically for
vehicular networks. It, however, introduces new infrastruc-
ture, named Roadside Equipment (RSE), as well as requires
servers to run in network infrastructure. For this reason,
we believe it is not readily deployable. Raya et. al. have
proposed a Vehicular Public Key Infrastructure in which
keys are uploaded and bound to an Electronic License Plate
(ELP) [10]. However, this approach is not complete and
faces many challenges including revocation, since keys are
uploaded for a long period of time, CAs and what their role
would be in message-to-message authentication, and denial
of service attacks. Furthermore, it requires the deployment
of new infrastructure, ELPs. In contrast to current solu-
tions, VIBES was designed from the beginning to exten-
sively utilize existing infrastructure and not require major
infrastructure changes.
The use of existing infrastructure in vehicular networks
has been briefly touched upon in literature. Yan et al.
prevent Sybil and position-based attacks by using on-board
radar, which is available in some vehicles today and prob-
ably most in the future, as an “eye” to verify claimed GPS
positioning data [14]. By using data obtained from radar,
along with neighbor reports, vehicles attempting to fake po-
sition information can be caught. This is a useful technique;
however, it does not concentrate on general authentication,
only secure position information.
6. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present VIBES, a means of securing ve-
hicular networks using Identity-based Encryption. VIBES
was developed to be secure, scalable, and efficient; delay
tolerant; DoS resistant; and easily integrated with existing
infrastructure. In the future, we plan to fully develop and
implement VIBES in a semi-transparent fashion, as a clean
and functional application layer API. This will allow dis-
tributed applications easy access to security. Furthermore,
we plan to explore more in-depth how the vehicular network
can securely transport key revocation lists when vehicles are
out of radio tower range, but still connected to the vehicu-
lar network. Finally, we plan to explore different proposed
routing options, including delay-tolerant network routing, to
better understand the interplay between the routing layer
and VIBES, allowing for fine-tuned optimizations.
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